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I. INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky Derby, the Preakness Stakes, and the Belmont
Stakes-the three jewels of Thoroughbred horseracing's Triple Crown.'
These are the three races that exemplify the glamour of the industry in the
United States. Most of the fans who attend those races-and indeed, who
attend most races-come to the track simply to socialize, to watch the
beautiful animals race to reach the wire first, and perhaps to bet a few dollars
on their favorite horses. However, there are a smaller number of individuals
who invest vast sums of money2 to breed and race Thoroughbreds.
It is for these individuals-those involved in the investment of
Thoroughbreds to breed and race-that this article is mainly written. Section
II discusses the federal and Kentucky definitions of a security by reviewing
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws. The section also
undertakes a review of the federal and Kentucky courts' decisions to provide
an understanding of an investment contract. The final aspect of Section II
applies the federal and Kentucky tests for investment contracts to shares of
syndicated Thoroughbreds to determine whether they can be considered
securities. Section m begins by explaining the federal and Kentucky
exemptions from the securities registration requirements as established in both
. Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
Masters in Business Administration, The Ohio State University, Fisher College of
Business, expected 2012. The author thanks Professor Paul Rose for his insights
and suggestions for this paper. Special thanks are owed to those gentlemen who
generously agreed to be interviewed for this note. Without their contributions, this
note would not be possible. They are Robert Beck, Member of Stites & Harbison;
Doug Cauthen, President & CEO of WinStar Farm; Joshua Cooper, COO of West
Point Thoroughbreds; Barry Irwin, CEO of Team Valor International; and James
Philpott, Of Counsel for Stoll Keenon Ogden. Any errors or misstatements are
solely the fault of the author.
' Of which there have been eleven winners, the most recent being Affirmed in
1978.
2 In some cases, tens of millions of dollars.
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the federal and Kentucky statutes and regulations. It then considers the effect
those exemptions would likely have if they are applied to shares of syndicated
Thoroughbreds in both the breeding and racing contexts. Finally, Section IV
provides a brief concluding summary of the federal and Kentucky securities
laws' impact on the syndicated shares of Thoroughbreds.
H. ARE SHARES OF SYNDICATED THOROUGHBREDS SECURITIES?:
FEDERAL AND KENTUCKY TESTS FOR INVESTMENT CONTRACTS APPLIED
TO SYNDICATED THOROUGHBREDS
This section lays out the definitions of a security and the registration
requirements for those securities. It first reviews the federal definition of a
"security" as defined in the Securities Act of 19333 and then analyzes the
federal courts' interpretation of the definition of an "investment contract"
starting with the United States Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Howey.4 It
next completes the analogous process for Kentucky, looking at the Kentucky
definition of a security as well as the Kentucky state courts' understanding of
an investment contract. Finally, the section applies the federal and Kentucky
tests for investment contracts to shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds in the
breeding and racing contexts to determine whether those shares are securities.
A. Federal Securities Laws and the Howey Test for Investment
Contracts
1. The Securities Act of 1933: Definitions and Registration
Requirements
a. Section 2(1): The Definition ofa Security
The first step in analyzing whether a share of a syndicated
Thoroughbred can be considered a security-and therefore subject to
securities laws registration requirements-is to know how the term "security"
is defined by Congress and understood by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 lays out the
specific definition for a security.' That definition includes a very long and
extensive list of items that constitute securities. Of course, the typical
instruments such as "note[s], stock[s] . . . security future[s], bond[s], [and]
debenture[s]" top the list.' But the definition also includes, among many other
3 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
4 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
s Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1).
6 See id.
7id.
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things, "fractional .. . interest[s] in . .. mineral rights."8 Finally, the definition
includes a catchall term, the "investment contract."9
It is these investment contracts that are of critical importance to
examining whether shares of Thoroughbreds can be considered securities
because these types of securities are the ones under which the shares would
most likely fall.10 Though an investment contract is not defined in the
Securities Act of 1933, the United States Supreme Court has provided a test
that sheds light on when certain business arrangements qualify as investment
contracts subject to securities laws." This test will be discussed below in
Sections II-A-2 and II-A-3. If the arrangement does qualify as a security, then
it is subject to the Securities Act registration requirements unless it is granted
an exemption.12 These federal exemptions will be discussed in Section 11m-A
below.
b. Section 5: Prohibitions Relating to Interstate Commerce
and the Mails
Section 5 of the Securities Act is vitally important to the control of
issued securities because it places limits on the methods of solicitation used to
sell securities if there is no registration statement in place.13 Unless otherwise
exempted, a security is subject to section 5's registration requirements,14 and
thus subject to federal securities laws. Section 5's limits make it unlawful to
use the instruments of interstate commerce or the mails to solicit the sale of or
to sell securities unless the securities are registered." Moreover, the
application of the different section 5 subsections is dependent on two specific
events in the offering and selling process, namely, the time at which the
registration statement is filed and the time at which it becomes effective.' 6
2. The Howey Test for Investment Contracts
After describing the federal definition of a security and the
registration requirements under the Securities Act of 1933, the next critical
aspect of this paper is to determine whether or not an interest-here, a share of
8 id.
9 Id.
1o See Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
11 See Sec. & Exch. Conmn'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
2 Id. at 297.
13 Securities Act of 1933 § 5.
14 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
15 Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)-(c).
16 LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 35 (2d ed.
2004).
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a Thoroughbred horse-is a security. Because the investment contract is the
type of security under which the share of a syndicated Thoroughbred will
likely fall if it is to be a security,' 7 it is critical to understand what determines
whether something is an investment contract.
Since the Securities Act leaves the term undefined, the United States
Supreme Court enunciated a test in its Howey decision for determining
whether a transaction is an investment contract.'8 There the Court held that an
investment contract is a "transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party."l 9 In other words, an investment
contract exists if there is "[1] an investment of money [2] in a common
enterprise [3] with profits to come [4] solely from the efforts of others."20
In establishing this test, the Court referred to several factors to
determine whether or not its definition of an investment contract is met.
Those factors include: whether the offer consists solely of a sale of property or
whether it consists of "an opportunity to contribute money and to share in the
profits"; whether the individual investors have the equipment and experience
necessary to run the operation themselves; whether the investors' desire is to
control the operation of the enterprise or whether they are attracted solely by
the potential profits generated by their investment; whether the enterprise is
managed and controlled by a party other than the investors; and whether there
is some evidence of the shares that allows for the determination of each
investor's pro rata portion of the profits.2 1
The Court stated that if the four elements numbered above are met,
then the contract can be considered a security "regardless of the legal
terminology used."22 Moreover, no actual sale need be consummated; the
Securities Act prohibits both the offer and the sale of unregistered, non-
21
exempt securities. Simply offering, or soliciting the purchase of, the
essential aspects of an investment contract is enough to create a security that is
24
covered by the Securities Act and SEC regulation.
17 Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
18 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
'9 Id. at 298-99.20 Id. at 301 (bracketed numbers added).
21 Id. at 299-300.
22 Id. at 300.
23 Id. at 301. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3) (2006) (definition of a sale of a
security); Id. § 5 (registration requirements of securities).24 Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
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3. The Howey Test Reshaped and Interpreted
Over time, the courts have reshaped and interpreted the four-pronged
Howey test.25 The evolvement of each of those parts will be discussed below,
focusing on rulings made by the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,26 and the United States District
Courts of Kentucky.
a Investment of Money
The most significant Supreme Court case addressing the issue of
whether there is an investment of money never made an official
pronouncement regarding the meaning of the term.2 7 However, the Court in
Daniel gave a fairly clear indication of what an investment of money is.2 8 It
noted that in every case where an investment contract had been found, "the
purchaser gave up some tangible and definable consideration in return for an
interest that had substantially the characteristics of a security."29  This
exchange of consideration for an interest in a security constitutes an
investment of money.
The Sixth Circuit's initial explanation of the meaning of an
investment of money applied a six-factor "risk capital" test to separate an
investment transaction from a mere commercial transaction.30 The six factors
considered by the Union Planters court were (1) time; (2) collateral; (3) form
of the obligation; (4) circumstances of the issuance; (5) relationship between
the amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business; and (6) intended
use of the funds.3 1 The Union Planters application of the "risk capital" test
was also followed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky, in a case decided later in 1981.32 In Wallace, the Eastern District
of Kentucky applied the same six factors to its analysis to determine if there
had been the presence of an investment in the case.33
25 See, e.g., United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)
(discussing the "expectation of profits" requirement).
26 The circuit in which Kentucky is located, and which Kentucky federal courts
must follow.
27 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
28 See id at 560.
29 d
30 Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loan, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174,
1182 (6th Cir. 1981).
3 Id.
32 Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 529 F. Supp. 258, 261 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
3 Id.
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However, two more recent rulings suggest that the Sixth Circuit no
longer adheres to the "risk capital" analysis to determine whether or not there
has been an investment satisfying the first prong of Howey. In the first case,
the Sixth Circuit took a step toward disavowing the "risk capital" test when it
implied that the "risk capital" test was too expansive to fit within the Howey
test.3 4  Moreover, in the most recent case, the Sixth Circuit, sitting in
Kentucky, found that there was an investment present in the simple situation
where checks from the plaintiff investors were received and cashed by the
defendant as part of the investment contract." In reaching its conclusion, the
Stone court completely avoided any application-indeed, any mention-of the
"risk capital" test. It simply stated that an investment was found where checks
intended for the investment were cashed. 6
The implications of this apparent Sixth Circuit trend impact the test
used by the Kentucky federal courts, since the District Courts of Kentucky are
bound to follow Sixth Circuit precedent. Current Sixth Circuit precedent
appears to point toward not applying the "risk capital" test for purposes of
determining whether an investment is present.37 In fact, the most recent case
to address the issue failed to even mention the "risk capital" test, implying that
it was not to be used to analyze the investment issue." The result in Stone
(the court found an investment of money where checks from the plaintiff
intended for the investment were cashed by the defendant) actually looks
much more like the United States Supreme Court's understanding of an
investment of money as given in Daniel.40 Thus, it appears that the Kentucky
federal courts would be likely to find the first prong of Howey satisfied if the
investor exchanges tangible consideration for an interest that can be
characterized as a security.4 1
b. Common Enterprise
Despite the many years since Howey was decided, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet provided a definition of a common enterprise to
satisfy Howey's second prong. However, the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals have addressed the issue, creating two separate formulations to
interpret "common enterprise."42 The first formulation, known as vertical
commonality, finds a common enterprise where "the fortunes of the investor
34 See Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1989).
35 Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1993).
37 See Stone, 8 F.3d at 1085; Deckebach, 867 F.2d at 281-82.
3 Stone, 8 F.3d at 1085.
39 id.
4 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 559 (1979).
41 See id.
42 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 4.
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are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and successes of those
seeking the investment or of third parties."A The alternative to vertical
commonality, horizontal commonality, was established initially by the
Seventh Circuit," although the court did not use the term in its discussion.
The Sixth Circuit subsequently followed the Seventh Circuit's lead, also
adopting the horizontal commonality approach to finding a common
enterprise."
In adopting horizontal commonality as the requirement, the Sixth
Circuit explained that to satisfy that requirement for the purposes of finding a
common enterprise, there must be both the pooling of investor funds as well as
a relationship between the investors themselves "which ties the fortunes of
each investor to the success of the overall venture."" In order to find this
pooling of funds, the Sixth Circuit noted that it would look beyond the specific
agreement each investor formed with the manager of the funds to find
horizontal commonality.47 Following Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth
Circuit stated that the economic realities of the agreement-essentially the
totality of the circumstances-must be considered in order to properly
determine whether the horizontal commonality requirement is satisfied to find
a common enterprise.48 Perhaps the best indication of the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of horizontal commonality is found in the Union Planters
opinion. There, the court found horizontal commonality where the fortunes of
the investors were "inextricably intertwined.""9 According to the Sixth
Circuit, all investors in a common enterprise share a common fortune.so
Along with horizontal commonality, the Sixth Circuit has required that there
43 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1973). See also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Glenn W Turner). The vertical commonality
espoused by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits is considered strict vertical commonality.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted broad vertical commonality (an easier test to
satisfy), which does not require that the issuer or promoter share in any risk with
the investors. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727,
732 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) ("That [broad vertical commonality] test requires the movant
'to show that the investors are dependent upon the expertise or efforts of the
investment promoter for their returns."') (internal citation omitted).
4 See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1972).
4s Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th
Cir. 1980), af'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
4 Id. at 223-24.
47 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Prof 1 Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 354 (6th Cir. 1984).
48 Id. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
49 Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loan, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir. 1981).
50Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 282 (6th Cir. 1989).
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also be proof of a vertical relationship between the buyer and the seller of the
investment interest to find a common enterprise under Howey.5'
Despite the many Sixth Circuit opinions offering a clarification of the
horizontal commonality test for a common enterprise, the Federal District
Courts of Kentucky have done no interpretation of their own. One court, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, simply noted the Sixth
Circuit's Union Planters definition of horizontal commonality.52 The same
court, in an earlier ruling, emphasized the pooling requirement of horizontal
commonality, finding that a promissory note entered into solely between a
single holder and one issuer did not constitute a common enterprise. 3
However, because both of these decisions occurred in the Eastern District of
Kentucky, they are not binding on the Western District of Kentucky; the Sixth
Circuit decisions on the issue of what constitutes a common enterprise are
binding on both districts, though. Hence, in a Kentucky federal court, a
common enterprise will be found where there is both a vertical relationship
between the buyer and the seller5 4 as well as a horizontal relationship amongst
the buyer-investors themselves. 5
c. Expectation of Profits
In interpreting the third prong of Howey, the Supreme Court has noted
two alternatives for what constitutes profits: (1) the capital appreciation that
results from managing and developing the original investment; and (2) a
participation in earnings that are derived from the use of the investors' funds.5 6
The Court's decision in Forman also implied what is meant by the expectation
of profits. An expectation of profits exists when the investor is attracted only
to the potential returns on his investment.57 However, where the investor is
interested in the investment because of his intent to "use or consume" the item
purchased, there is no expectation of profits. In the former case, an
investment contract and, therefore, a security, would be found; in the latter
case, no investment contract would exist, and so no security would be found.59
The Sixth Circuit and the Federal District Courts of Kentucky have
done very little additional interpretation of this prong of the Howey test. In
Union Planters, the Sixth Circuit noted the Howey criteria of profits-either
5' Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 394 (6th Cir. 1989).
52 Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
5 Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 529 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
54 Newmyer, 888 F.2d at 394.
5 Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th
Cir. 1980).
56 United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)57id
5 Id. at 852-53.
59 See id. at 853.
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capital apreciation or earnings from the use of investor funds-but went no
further.6  The Federal District Courts of Kentucky have also failed to offer
their opinion on the meaning of "expectation of profits," instead seemingly
addressing other more contentious issues.
Thus, this lack of development within the Sixth Circuit and the
Federal District Courts of Kentucky suggests two things. First, the Howey-
Forman combined understanding of profits is probably the test that will be
followed by the Sixth Circuit and the Federal District Courts of Kentucky.
Second, the test for the "expectation of profits" prong of Howey is apparently
easily applied in most cases. The only instance in which a court may tend not
to find an expectation of profits is in a situation in which Forman applies,
meaning that the investment was made for the "use or consum[ption]" of the
item rather than for returns generated by appreciation or management of the
funds invested.
d. Solely from the Efforts of Others
Though the Supreme Court in Howey stated that profits on the
investment must be "solely from the efforts of others," 62 later decisions by the
Court have created uncertainty as to whether "solely" should be read
literally. The Court in Forman, while describing the Howey test, explained
that "the touchstone [of an investment contract] is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others.""6 The Court clearly left "solely" out of its interpretation in Forman,
but then also stated that it expressed no opinion as to whether "solely" should
be read literally or not.65 A later Supreme Court case, Daniel, also followed
the investment contract definition as interpreted by Forman.6 6 However, in
both Forman and Daniel, the question of whether "solely" was to be
interpreted literally was not at issue, and the Forman court explicitly stated as
much. In the only case in which the "solely" language was arguably at
issue, the Supreme Court left much to be desired in its conclusion. The
60 Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loan, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174,
1184 (6th Cir. 1981).
61 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53.
62 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
63 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561; Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004).
64 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 (bracketed text and emphasis added).
65 Id. at 852 n.16.
66 Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561.
67 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
68 Edwards, 540 U.S. at 389.
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Edwards Court did continue both the Howey and Forman formulations of an
investment contract discussed previously, but it failed to describe how to
interpret "solely." Without interpreting "solely," the Court simply concluded
that just because investors had contracted with the seller for a fixed return, it
did not mean that the return would not come solely from the efforts of the
seller.69
Because the Supreme Court has provided little assistance in
interpreting the fourth prong of the Howey test, it is necessary to review the
decisions of the Sixth Circuit and the Federal District Courts of Kentucky.
First, the Union Planters court stated that to satisfy the fourth prong of the
Howey test, the profits must be "derived from the managerial or
entrepreneurial efforts of others."7 o Moreover, mere administrative tasks, such
as supervising the investment or collecting payments do not qualify as
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts for purposes of the fourth prong.7 In
addition, the Sixth Circuit has provided its own understanding of how the term
"solely" is to be interpreted.72 The court stated that "solely" is not to be read
literally.73  Instead, the court will consider the economic realities of the
agreement.74 As the Odom court noted, the problem with reading "solely"
literally is that such a reading would exclude from securities laws any
enterprise in which the investor took any sort of role.7 ' The reason for this
result is that the profits would not come only from the efforts of others.76 This
indicates that complete investor passivity is not a requirement to satisfy the
fourth prong. Actually, the Sixth Circuit, following the leads of other circuits,
has stated that enterprises will not be excluded from classification as
investment contract securities as long as the investor's involvement does not
entail a significant managerial role.
In fact, the distinction between passive and active investors is the area
given the most attention by the Sixth Circuit in interpreting the fourth prong of
Howey. The Professional Associates court found specifically that the
presence of purely passive investors compelled the finding of an investment
78
contract. And the Odom court specifically noted that a general partnership
69 Id at 397.
70 Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loan, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174,
1185 (6th Cir. 1981).
1 Id.
72 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Prof'I Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984).
7 Id.
74 d
7s Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1983).
76 Id. at 215.
n Id.
78 Prof lAssocs., 731 F.2d at 357.
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typically does not qualify as a security.7 9 This is because a general partner
usually has managerial powers that enable him to protect himself to such an
extent that it takes him outside the scope of the securities acts.so Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit has concluded that as long as the general partner has the power
to participate in a managerial capacity, even if that power is not exercised, the
partnership will not be considered a security.81
However, there may be instances where a general partnership is
classified as a security. Principally, quoting the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
has determined that:
A general partnership or a joint venture interest can be
designated a security if the investor can establish, for
example, that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so
little power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the
arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced
or unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of
intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or
(3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or
manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise
or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture
powers.82
Interestingly, the quote also demonstrates that where an investor's powers in
the enterprise are limited by the agreement, as, for example, in a limited
partnership (LP), a security may be found.83  This is also the case in a
manager-managed limited liability company (LLC)." In contrast to the LP
and the manager-managed LLC, the simple selection of other types of
business entities such as the member-managed LLC or the general partnership
provides an additional avenue for issuers to avoid classification of their
enterprise as a security.s
7 Odom, 703 F.2d at 215. This was also stated by Robert Beck, a practicing equine
attorney in Kentucky. Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, Member, Stites &
Harbison (Jan. 29, 2010).
80 Odom, 703 F.2d at 215.
SId. at 216.
Id. at 215 (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981)).
83 Odom, 703 F.2d at 215.
8 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, COO, West Point Thoroughbreds, Inc.
(Jan. 28, 2010).
85 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79; Telephone Interview with
James Philpott, Of Counsel, Stoll Keenon Ogden (Jan. 26, 2010).
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In the most recent Sixth Circuit case to directly address the fourth
prong of Howey, the court enunciated several factors that are relevant in
determining whether an investor's contractual powers can realistically be
exercised or whether they were simply added to the investment agreement in
an attempt to avoid the securities laws. Citing the Eighth Circuit, the first
three factors are: (1) the investor's lack of business knowledge; (2) his lack of
finances; and (3) his lack of control over the operations. The Sixth Circuit
also added three other additional factors to the list, including: (4) the nature of
the product sold; (5) the character of the selling firm; and (6) the nature of the
industry in which the investment is involved. 8
The Federal District Courts of Kentucky have also offered some
guidance on the interpretation of the fourth prong of Howey. Notably, the
Eastern District of Kentucky recognized the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the fourth prong, which read "solely from the efforts of others" to really be a
question of whether the efforts made by the manager of the investment were
the "undeniably significant ones."89 Two other cases, however, both in the
Eastern District of Kentucky, decided not to use the "undeniably significant"
language recognized by Smith.90 Instead, both opinions understood the fourth
prong of Howey in the same way as the Sixth Circuit's interpretation did in
Union Planters.9' Both concluded that to satisfy the fourth prong, the profits
of the enterprise must be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of those other than the investors. 92  However, the "undeniably
significant" language was later used by the Sixth Circuit to provide further
interpretation of the fourth prong.93  Because the "undeniably significant"
language was set forth in its most recent case to directly address the fourth
prong, it is likely the Sixth Circuit's preferred construction of the "solely from
the efforts of others" language of Howey. This makes that approach binding
on the Federal District Courts of Kentucky as well.
86 McCoy v. Hilliard, 940 F.2d 660 (Table), 1991 WL 132522, at *8 (6th Cir.
1991).87 Id. (citing Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978) and Fargo
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976)).
88 McCoy, 1991 WL 132522, at *8.
89 Smith v. Manausa, 385 F. Supp. 443, 448 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (quoting Glenn W.
Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
90 See Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985); Am.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 529 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
91 See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loan, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174, 1185 (6th Cir. 1981).
92 Kefalas, 630 F. Supp. at 8; Wallace, 529 F. Supp. at 263.
93 McCoy, 1991 WL 132522, at *8.
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B. Kentucky Securities Laws and the Kentucky Test for Investment
Contracts
The efforts to avoid securities laws issues in the Thoroughbred
industry-by either showing that shares of a Thoroughbred are not securities
or by exempting the shares from registration if they are securities-do not
pertain only to the federal laws; states, too, have their own securities laws. In
fact, before Congress had even passed the Securities Act of 1933, most states
had already been involved in regulating securities for many years.94
Compared to the Securities Act, most state securities law schemes involve a
similar process of regulation." The securities must typically be registered
before sale, unless the registration is preempted by federal law or there is an
exemption available under which the securities are covered.
Because state laws are also critically important to the securities laws
issues surrounding shares of Thoroughbreds, the following subsections
address the Commonwealth of Kentucky's approach to the regulation of
securities under its state blue sky laws. Fortunately, the process for examining
the Kentucky securities laws below is virtually identical to that followed
above to describe the federal securities laws. Section II-B-1 below discusses
the Kentucky definition of a security as well as provides a summation of the
Kentucky registration requirements. Section II-B-2 explains how the Courts
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky understand the term "investment
contract." As will become evident, the Kentucky definition of a security and
the Kentucky state courts' definition of an investment contract are incredibly
similar to their federal counterparts.
1. The Kentucky Blue Sky Laws: Definitions and Registration
Requirements
a. Section 292.310(18): The Definition ofa Security
Just as with the process of analyzing the applicability of securities
laws in the federal law context, the first step in determining whether state
securities laws apply to shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds is to know how
the Kentucky General Assembly has defined the term "security" and how the
Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions' Division of Securities
understands the term. Section 292.310(18) of the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws
94 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 19.
95 Id. at 20.
96 id.
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contains the specific definition of a security.97 Like the Securities Act
definition at the federal level, the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws definition of
"security" begins with those things most commonly thought of as securities,
particularly notes, stocks, bonds, and debentures.98 The Kentucky definition
also includes such things as fractional interests in mineral rights.99 Finally,
and most importantly, as with the Securities Act definition, the Kentucky Blue
Sky Laws definition contains within it the investment contract. 00
As Congress failed to do in the Securities Act of 1933, the Kentucky
General Assembly has also not defined the term "investment contract" in its
Blue Sky Laws. However, the Courts of Kentucky have come to the rescue,
enunciating their definition of an investment contract, as will be explained in
Section II-B-2. This point is important because, as noted previously, if a share
of a Thoroughbred is to be considered a security, it would have to be so as an
investment contract.o'0 Moreover, if a share of a syndicated Thoroughbred is
found to be a security, it will be subject to the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws'
registration requirements unless it is granted a state exemption.10 2
b. Sections 292.340 - 292.370: Registration Requirements
Section 292.340 of the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws establishes the
general registration requirements to offer to sell securities in the state.
Specifically, it is unlawful to sell or offer to sell any unregistered securities
within Kentucky, with certain exceptions.' 03 Those exceptions are if the
security or the transaction is exempt under chapter 292 or if the security is a
covered security.1'4 Pursuant to the Blue Sky Laws, there are three different
ways securities may be registered in Kentucky. They are as follows, but, for
the purposes of this paper, they will be given no more than cursory review.
The first method of registering a security in Kentucky, codified in
section 292.350, is through notification. 05 The availability of registration by
notification is based largely on past issuer action and performance with respect
to securities, as well as certain issuer earnings thresholds.10 6 The second
means of registering a security in compliance with Kentucky Blue Sky Laws
9 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.310(18) (West 2009). See generally KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 292 (West 2009) [hereinafter Blue Sky Laws].
98 id
99Id.
1 Id.
or1 Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
102 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 20.
103 Blue Sky Laws § 292.340 (West 2009).
4Id.
'osId. § 292.350.
' See id. § 292.350(1)(a)-(b).
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is registration by coordination as provided in section 292.360.107 This section
makes eligible for registration by coordination those securities for which a
registration statement has been filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of
1933 or an offering statement has been filed with the SEC under Regulation A
of the Securities Act of 1933.08 For registration by coordination, the
registration statement becomes automatically effective at the moment the
federal registration statement because effective, 09 provided certain other
criteria is satisfied."o The third method of registering a security pursuant to
Kentucky Blue Sky Laws is registration by qualification, provided for in
section 292.370."' This method is available to register any security,"12 but
there is a very extensive list of requirements that the registration statement
must contain in order to register by qualification." 3 Most notably, compared
to registration by notification or coordination, registration by qualification
requires a great deal more disclosure of certain financial statements, with the
amount of disclosure increasing as the amount of proceeds from the offering
increases.1 14
2. The Kentucky Test for Investment Contracts
a. Investment Contracts as Defined by the Kentucky Courts
In order for a share of a syndicated Thoroughbred to be considered a
security for purposes of the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws, it will likely have to fall
under the auspices of an investment contract," 5 just as was the case under the
Securities Act on the federal level. However, because the Kentucky General
Assembly has left the term "investment contract" undefined in its statutes, it is
necessary to review the cases decided by the Kentucky state courts.
Surprisingly, even with the level of sophistication contained in the
Blue Sky Laws, there have only been two Kentucky cases that have directly
addressed the issue of defining "investment contract" as it applies to state
securities laws. First, in 1974, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, then the
highest court in the Commonwealth," 6 made its ruling on the issue." 7 The
107 Id. § 292.360.
108 Id. § 292.360(1).
109 Id. § 292.360(3).
110 Id.
"' Id. § 292.370.
112 Id. § 292.370(1).
" See id. § 292.370(2).
114 See id. § 2 9 2 .3 7 0(2 )(p).
"s Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
"
6 Id. at 9.
"7 Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138, 141, 142 (Ky. 1974).
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Waddle court adopted as the rule for Kentucky the definition for an investment
contract as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Howey."' The
Waddle court stated that the test for an investment contract was "whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
to come solely from the efforts of others."" 9 However, the court also
recognized that the use of the term "solely" as set forth in the Howey test was
too restrictive.120 As a result, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's language to
resolve the issue, stating that "solely" should be not be read strictly or literally
and instead should be interpreted realistically to include those enterprises that
are securities in substance. 12 1 Principally, the Waddle court found an
investment contract where the investors themselves had to exert some effort to
generate the profits, even though the profits were not "solely" the result of
others' efforts.122
The second and more recent case to interpret "investment contract"
was decided in late 2007.123 Citing Waddle, the Greenleaf court noted
Kentucky's adoption of the Howey test.124 However, in enunciating its
understanding of the test, the court also rewrote the test to consider the Waddle
court's decision not to read "solely" literally.125  The test, as stated in
Greenleaf interpreted Waddle to find an investment contract where there is
"l) the presence of an investment; 2) in a common scheme or enterprise; 3)
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits; 4) to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 2 6 Several things are notable
about this test. Clearly, the first three prongs square with Howey. The fourth
prong is different from that of Howey though. In fact, the "entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others" language is exactly comparable to the language
in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fonnan.'27
The Court of Appeals in Greenleaf also clarified another aspect of the
Kentucky interpretation of "investment contract" as it pertains to the Kentucky
Blue Sky Laws. Without using the exact terminology, the Greenleaf court
recognized that the common enterprise requirement was subject to horizontal
" Id. at 141.
1l9 Id. (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301
(1945)).
120 Waddle, 507 S.W.2d at 142.
121 Id.
122 id
123 Commonwealth ex rel. Comm'r of Dep't of Fin. Insts. of Commonwealth v.
Greenleaf Mktg. Corp., No. 2006-CA-001934-MR, 2007 WL 3406766 (Ky. Ct.
App. Nov. 16, 2007).
12 Id. at *1.
125 id
126 id
127 Compare Greenleaf 2007 WL 3406766, at *I with United Housing Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
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commonality.128 The court suggested that to find a common enterprise, the
investors must pool their money and they much each share in the overall
success and failure of the enterprise.129
Thus, it appears that the test for an investment contract in Kentucky is
the Howey test with a flexible reading of the term "solely." This is at least
how the Greenleaf court understood Waddle. 30  Considering Waddle's
mandate for flexible interpretation of "solely," it is unlikely that the Kentucky
Supreme Court will reject the Greenleaf understanding of an investment
contract. The result, therefore, is that the lower courts in Kentucky will likely
apply the Greenleaf test unless and until the Kentucky Supreme Court decides
a change is necessary. Overall, then, Kentucky's definition of an investment
contract as it applies to the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws is largely identical to the
United States' definition of an investment contract as it applies to the
Securities Act of 1933.
b. The Kentucky Securities Regulations: 10:360132 and
Investment Contracts
While the investment contract analysis is a court-determined test,
there is an interesting qualification to the definition of investment contracts
provided for in section 10:360 of the Kentucky Securities Regulations. This
section acts as a safe harbor for membership interests in member-managed
LLCs, establishing that those interests are not considered investment
contracts.13 3 However, certain criteria must be met to fall within the safe
harbor. First, the aggregate number of membership interests after all interests
are sold must not exceed thirty-five.13 4 In addition to this requirement, at least
one of the following three points must also be satisfied: (1) Each member is
actively engaged in the management of the LLC13 s; (2) The articles of
organization vest management power of the LLC in a manager who is a
member and also provide that a simple majority vote of the members may
128 Greenleaf, 2007 WL 3406766, at *2.
129 d
130 Id. at * 1. Note that the Greenleaf court never mentioned Fornan in its opinion.
Instead, it attributed the "investment contract" test, including the "entrepreneurial
and managerial efforts of others" language to the Waddle court. This Forman
language is presumed by the author to be the method chosen by the Court of
Appeals to address Waddle's mandate for Kentucky courts not to read "solely"
literally.
131 See supra note 127 for a comparison of the federal and Kentucky tests.
132 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:360 (2006).
133 Id. 1.
134 d
15id § 1(1).
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replace the manager with any other member'36; or (3) Under either the
applicable law or the articles of organization, each member has the power to
act for or bind the LLC.3 7
Thus, the satisfaction of the above criteria means that interests in a
member-managed LLC are not considered securities under Kentucky state
securities laws. This regulation, however, is only applicable to member-
managed LLCs and does not pertain to manager-managed LLCs, general
partnerships, or LPs. Furthermore, because there is no analogous federal
regulation, membership interests in member-managed LLCs would still be
subject to the Howey-Forman analysis to determine their status as securities
under the Securities Act. In practice, though, a member-managed LLC
operating pursuant to section 10:360 will also likely fail to satisfy the fourth
prong of Howey-Forman, and so interests in that member-managed LLC will
presumably not be classified as securities under federal law. 3 8
C. Whether a Share of a Thoroughbred is a Security: Breeding and
Racing Contexts
Since the federal and Kentucky definitions of an investment contract
have both been discussed, it is necessary to complete the first step of this
paper's analysis by applying these definitions to the shares of syndicated
Thoroughbreds to determine whether those shares are in fact securities. The
federal and Kentucky investment contract definitions will first be applied to
shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds in the breeding context, and will then be
applied in the racing context.
1. The Breeding Context
a. Syndicating a Thoroughbred Stallion for Breeding
Before applying the securities laws, it is imperative to understand
exactly what syndication is. The process of syndicating a Thoroughbred for
breeding involves selling fractional interests (shares) in the stallion.139
136 Id. § 1(2).
37Id § 1(3).
138 See supra pp. 217-20 for the discussion of the fourth prong of Howey-Fornan.
For purposes of both federal and Kentucky securities laws, satisfaction of the
fourth prong requires that profits come largely from the efforts of others. United
Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); Scholarship
Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138, 141, 141 (Ky. 1974). Because of the
active involvement of members or their power to remove the manager, member-
managed LLCs fall short of satisfying this fourth prong.
'9 Timothy Nicolas Sweeney, Comment, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms: A
Practical Approach to Thoroughbred Breeding Syndications and Securities Law,
75 KY. L.J. 419, 422 (1987).
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Usually, each stallion syndication will consist of fifty shares, on average.14 0
Typically, the share includes the right to breed a mare to the stallion each
year.14' This right, called a "season" or a "nomination," can be sold each
year.14 2 Moreover, the farm retains exclusive control over the breeding career
of the stallion, including the right to refuse mares, sometimes even those
mares proposed by syndicate owners.14 3
The reasons for syndicating a Thoroughbred stallion are two-fold.
First, the farm, which usually buys the stallion privately before syndication,
uses syndication to spread risk.1" Ideally, the farm would retain one hundred
percent ownership of the stallions it buys to breed.14 5 This is not feasible,
however, because of the significant amount of money required to purchase a
stallion prospect, as well as the fact that the farm would carry all the risk of the
stallion prospect's success or failure at stud.'" So the farm instead syndicates
the stallion, sells some of the shares, and maintains some level of ownership,
usually around fifty percent.14 7 However, a farm may choose to own more or
less than fifty percent depending on its financial needs.14 8 Regardless of what
percentage ownership is retained, selling off some amount results in a shift of
some risk to the share purchasers.149
The second reason for syndicating a stallion is to provide the farm
with some certainty regarding breeding.'50 Because the share usually includes
the right to breed a mare to the stallion each year, the farm assures itself of at
least some breeding prospects for the stallion.'5' Since the farm retains the
shares that are not sold, it also can either breed its own broodmares to its
stallions or it can sell seasons to non-shareholding breeders. 52 The sale of
seasons to non-shareholding breeders is what generates additional substantial
revenues, and potentially profits, for the farm.
b. Is a Share of a Breeding Thoroughbred a Security?
140 Telephone Interview with Doug Cauthen, President & CEO, WinStar Farm LLC
(Jan. 26, 2010).
141 Sweeney, supra note 139, at 422.
142 id
143 Telephone Interview with Doug Cauthen, supra note 140.
'" Id.
145 id
146 id
147 Id.
148 id
149 id.
1 Id.
152 d
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Now that syndication for breeding purposes has been described, the
more important step of applying securities laws to syndicated shares of
Thoroughbred stallions can be undertaken. Obtaining the answer to whether a
share of a breeding Thoroughbred constitutes a security would ordinarily be
difficult because one must consider both federal and state securities laws.
Fortunately, there are two significant sources of guidance with regard to
syndicating Thoroughbreds for breeding.
The first source is a no-action letter issued by the SEC that describes
the SEC's position with regard to whether shares of Thoroughbreds for
breeding can be considered securities. 53 This letter, known to those involved
in Thoroughbred syndicates as the Gainesway No-Action Letter, provides a
list of ten criteria which, if satisfied, cause the syndication interests to fall
outside the scope of the federal (and, in practice, the state) securities laws.15 4
The list of criteria is as follows: (1) The interests in the stallion must
be sold only to breeders for use in their business; (2) Each shareholder-breeder
must have complete title and control with respect to any offspring his mare
produces; (3) There is to be no pooling of income or sharing in any gain or
loss; (4) The owner is to retain any unpurchased shares; (5) The maintenance
costs are to be divided pro rata according to the number of nominations each
breeder can use; (6) The compensation of the syndicate manager must be
disclosed; (7) There must be a provision addressing the issue of excess
nominations, if any; (8) Each shareholder will have an insurable fractional
interest in the stallion; (9) There must be a provision addressing the right of
the breeders to sell their respective shares; and (10) The shareowner-breeder
may sell any unused nomination to another breeder.'55
A principal reason why the SEC chose to take no action against John
Gaines for syndicating stallions without registering the shares is based on the
Forman test.'56 Recall that the Forman Court stated that when an investor is
motivated by his desire to use or consume the item purchased, there is no
expectation of profits.'" And where there is no expectation of profits, the
Howey-Forman test is not satisfied, so the investment does not constitute a
security.
To satisfy the first criterion of the Gainesway No-Action Letter, the
shares must essentially be sold to those who intend to use or consume them for
breeding purposes. 5 8 Moreover, the third criterion touches upon the Howey-
1 John R. Gaines and Gainesway Farm, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL
10973 (July 18, 1977).
15 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with James Philpott, supra note 85.
15s Gainesway, supra note 153, at *3.
15 id.
1s7 United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975).
158 Gainesway, supra note 153, at *3
2010 Shares of Thoroughbreds as Securities: Federal and 229
Kentucky Securities Laws Implications for Syndication in the
Breeding and Racing Contexts
Forman test as well as the horizontal commonality requirements established in
both the federal and state courts of Kentucky.159 As it says, there is to be no
pooling of funds and sharing in gains or losses.160 This defeats horizontal
commonality, and causes the failure to trigger the "common enterprise" prong
of Howey.161 Finally, several of the criteria working together, especially the
ninth and tenth criteria ensure active participation and involvement on the part
of the breeder-shareowners. This results again in the failure to satisfy the
fourth prong of Howey-Forman, which requires that any returns be generated
by the managerial efforts of others.162 It is clearly evident that following these
ten criteria accepted by the SEC results in the finding that syndicated shares of
Thoroughbreds for breeding are not investment contracts because three of the
four prongs of the Howey-Forman test go unsatisfied.
The Gainesway No-Action Letter is not the only source of guidance
on the issue of whether shares of Thoroughbreds used for breeding can be
considered securities, however. In fact, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky decided a case dealing with this exact
issue.163 Though it was a federal court case, the Kefalas court addressed both
federal and state securities law issues and concluded that under the specific
facts of the case, the claims for the presence of an investment contract failed to
meet both the federal and Kentucky tests."
In the case, the court found three important aspects: (1) the
syndication agreement showed that it was designed to allow the purchaser to
use or consume the investment'65 ; (2) applying horizontal commonality, the
fractional interests were unitary in nature and each would succeed or fail
regardless of how the other interests performed'6 6 ; and (3) the profits to be
derived from the plaintiff-shareowner's selling of their nomination rights were
to be the result of the plaintiff-shareowner's own efforts.167
The first point above shows that where the syndication is designed for
the interest to be used rather than to produce profits for investors, the
"expectation of profits" prong of Howey is not met. The second point
1 See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222
(6th Cir. 1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Comm'r of Dep't of Fin. Insts. of
Commonwealth v. Greenleaf Mktg. Corp., No. 2006-CA-001934-MR, 2007 WL
3406766, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007).
160 Gainesway, supra note 153, at *3.
161 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
162 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
163 Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
64Id. at 8-9.
165 Id. at 8.
16id.
167 id
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demonstrates that the "common enterprise" prong of Howey is also not met
given that there is no horizontal commonality. The third point defeats another
prong of Howey-Forman, namely, that the profits be derived from the
managerial efforts of others. The result is that the investments at issue in
Kefalas were found not to be securities.'68 The outcome was the same for
both federal and state securities law requirements because of Kentucky's
adoption of the Howey-Forman test.'69
Importantly, the Kefalas court limited its holding to the facts of the
case, noting that variations in the terms of the agreement may result in the
finding of an investment contract.o In Kefalas, the apparent terms of the
agreement seemed to satisfy the criteria set forth in the Gainesway No-Action
Letter.'7' However, as both the court in Kefalas and the SEC in its Gainesway
No-Action Letter intimated, changing some of the many possible variables-
for example, having the syndicate manager guarantee to sell the shareowner's
172
nomination on his behalf-could result in the finding of a security.
2. The Racing Context
a. Syndicating a Thoroughbredfor Racing
The process of syndicating a Thoroughbred for racing purposes is
quite similar to doing so for breeding purposes. Essentially, it still involves
selling ownership interests that are considered undivided fractional
interests. 7 3 With racing syndicates, investors can usually buy two-and-a-half,
five, or ten percent interest in a horse.174 Those investors are also made aware
that they should not expect to make any profits on the investment because of
the high-risk nature of the sport; instead, the shares are bought for their
entertainment value.17 5 Any unsold percentage of each syndicated racehorse
remains owned by the syndicate.'76 Costs are distributed pro rata to each
investor, and profits, if there are any, are distributed in the same manner. 77
6 1 d. at 8-9.
1 Id. at 9 (citing Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138, 141
(Ky. 1974)).
"0 Kefalas, 630 F. Supp. at 7-8.
1' See id. at 7. The court seemingly precisely hits each of the Gainesway No-
Action Letter criteria.
172 See id. at 7-8; Gainesway, supra note 153, at *4.
17 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
174 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, CEO, Team Valor International (Jan. 21, 2010).
175 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.
176 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84.
1' Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.
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More importantly, the syndicate retains entire control over the racing career of
the syndicated horse.'
One of the interesting aspects of syndicating racehorses is how the
actual racing syndication is formed. Typically, racing syndicates carry out the
syndication by placing each horse in ownership under a separate business
entity." 9 For example, it is common to set up each horse syndicate as a
general partnership, a member-managed LLC, or a manager-managed LLC. s0
Doing so, however, raises certain securities law issues that must be addressed
in order to ensure there is no violation of federal or state securities laws.
b. Is the Share of a Racing Thoroughbred a Security?
In asking whether the shares of Thoroughbred syndicated for racing
purposes are considered securities, one place to start is with the business entity
form chosen to "own" the horse. For example, establishing a syndicate by
means of a general partnership or member-managed LLC is probably the
easiest way to avoid the registration requirements of federal and Kentucky
securities laws.' 8 ' This is because general partners and members of a
member-managed LLC have the power to participate in management, and as
long as they have that power, their enterprise will not be considered a
security.182 Furthermore, the Kentucky regulations explicitly provide that, for
purposes of the Kentucky Blue Sky Laws, membership interests in member-
managed LLCs are not investment contracts, and so are not securities."'
Even though they may be considered securities under federal law, the reality is
that those membership shares are also unlikely to be securities under federal
law.''
178 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.
' Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79; Telephone Interview
with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview with Barry Irwin, supra
note 174.
180 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79; Telephone Interview
with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview with Barry Irwin, supra
note 174. See also Dogwood Stables, Anatomy of a Partnership,
http://www.dogwoodstable.com/anatomy-of-a-partnership.shtml (last visited Feb.
1,2010).
181 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79; Telephone Interview
with James Philpott, supra note 85.
182 Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983). The same conclusion was
stated by Robert Beck in his interview. Telephone Interview with Robert Beck,
supra note 79.
18 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:360 § 1 (2006).
18 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
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However, securities problems may arise even in the case of a general
partnership or a member-managed LLC if the agreement really distributes
power in a manner similar to a limited partnership; or if the investors are so
inexperienced or unknowledgeable that they are incapable of intelligently
exercising their powers; or if the investors so rely on the managerial efforts of
the manager that the investors cannot reasonably exercise their partnership
powers.'18  The same problems also apply in the context of a manager-
managed LLC, in which the non-managing members do not play an active
role in the management of the syndication.'8 6 The inability of partners or
members to participate in management results in the satisfaction of the fourth
Howey-Forman prong because any returns generated on the investment are
largely the results of the efforts of others.18 7 However, this may be defeated
by giving member-shareowners votes regarding large capital expenditures for
the horse as well as decisions to dissolve the syndicate entity upon
culmination of the horse's racing career.18 It may also be defeated by giving
members the power to remove the managing member or managing partner. 89
Furthermore, like the case of syndicating Thoroughbred stallions for
breeding, there is another SEC no-action letter, the Star Recruit No-Action
Letter, that suggests that shares of Thoroughbreds syndicated for racing may
constitute securities.' 90 The difference between the Star Recruit No-Action
Letter and the Gainesway No-Action Letter lies in the fact that the syndication
of the racehorse Star Recruit was to involve a syndication of the horse
(without the use of a corporate entity) during his racing career, with each
shareholder also receiving breeding rights for Star Recruit's stud career.191
The details of the Star Recruit syndication agreement contain several
provisions that would appear to satisfy the Howey test. First, all decisions
regarding the management of the horse's racing career were to be made by the
racing manager.192 This is strong indication of the presence of the fourth
prong of Howey, that the profits be derived from the efforts of those other than
the investors.'93 Second, the prior racing success of Star Recruit as well as the
intent to distribute profits pro rata indicates that an expectation of profits is
18 See Odom, 703 F.2d at 215.
186 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84. West Point
Thoroughbreds establishes their syndicates as manager-managed LLCs, but also
relies on the Rule 506 exemption discussed below.
187 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
188 Telephone Interview with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.
189 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79. See also 808 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 10:360 § 1(2) (2006).
190 Syndication of Star Recruit, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 524353 (Nov. 18,
1993).
'9' Id. at *2.
192 Sd.
13See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
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warranted,' 94 thus meeting the third prong of Howey.'95 Third, the investors
were to share pro rata in the profits and losses of the syndicate during the
horse's racing career.'96 This seems to indicate the satisfaction of Howey's
common enterprise requirement,'9 7 and actually probably meets the Kentucky
horizontal commonality test for a common enterprise. 98 The investors all
share in the success or failure of the enterprise here because it is impossible
that one investor would realize a profit by owning a share of Star Recruit
while another would suffer a loss. Fourth, the investment of money in
exchange for the fractional interest in Star Recruit clearly satisfied the Howey
test's first requirement of an investment of money.'99
Thus, in the case of a racehorse syndicated during its racing career, it
would appear that the SEC's determination that it could not refuse to take
action in the syndication of Star Recruit strongly indicates that shares of
Thoroughbreds for racing can be found to be investment contracts. Indeed, to
approach the situation with any different attitude would be imprudent.2 00
Moreover, because Kentucky adopted the Howey-Forman test in Waddle and
Greenleaf, the conclusion is the same for both federal and Kentucky securities
laws.
However, as the discussion above suggests, syndicating a
Thoroughbred in the racing context through entities such as general
partnerships, member-managed LLCs, or manager-managed LLCs may be
enough to avoid having those interests classified as securities. This hinges on
the extent to which members or partners can actively participate in
management. If there are no active management opportunities for the
members or partners, it is likely that the shares will be considered investment
contract securities.20' Part of the problem with any of these entity forms,
though, is that the original issuer of the shares typically maintains full
202decisionmaking power with respect to the horse's racing career, giving
194 Star Recruit, supra note 190, at *1, *2.
'9 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
196 Star Recruit, supra note 190, at *2.
197 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
198 See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222
(6th Cir. 1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Comm'r of Dep't of Fin. Insts. of
Commonwealth v. Greenleaf Mktg. Corp., No. 2006-CA-00 1934-MR, 2007 WL
3406766, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007).
'9 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
200 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84.
201 See 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:360 § 1 (2006); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212,
215 (6th Cir. 1983).
Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
202 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.
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other members or partners little ability to determine when and where the horse
races. This may be enough to cause the interests in these entity forms to
satisfy the fourth prong of Howey-Forman, thus classifying them as
securities-assuming the other three prongs are met.
Even though syndicating a Thoroughbred racehorse through entity
forms such as general partnerships, member-managed LCCs, and manager-
managed LLCs can rebut the classification of those interests as securities, the
issue is still somewhat tenuous because it depends on the extent of the
manager's control. Thus, the safe way to proceed is to seriously consider the
possibility that the shares or interests of Thoroughbreds syndicated for racing
could be considered securities even if those shares are sold as interests in
general partnerships or LLCs.
M. ARE SHARES OF SYNDICATED THOROUGHBREDS EXEMPT FROM
REGISTRATION?: FEDERAL AND KENTUCKY EXEMPTIONS APPLIED TO
SYNDICATED THOROUGHBREDS
The second step in the application of federal and Kentucky securities
laws to the shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds is to understand how those
shares may be exempted from the federal and Kentucky securities registration
requirements, assuming the shares are found to be securities. Section rn-A
first explains the relevant federal securities laws exemptions, as set forth in
both the Securities Act of 1933 as well as the SEC regulations. Section HI-B
performs the analogous discussion for the Kentucky exemptions laid out in the
Kentucky Blue Sky Laws and the Kentucky Securities Regulations. Finally,
Section 111-C completes the process by applying those exemptions to shares of
syndicated Thoroughbreds, again in both the breeding and racing contexts.
A. Federal Exemptions from the Registration of Securities
As the Supreme Court explicitly stated when reviewing the issue in
Howey, the question of whether an investment can be considered an
investment contract and thus a security is only the first question to be
answered.203 If indeed a security is found, then the security is subject to the
Securities Act registration requirements found in section 5(a) unless the
security is covered by an exemption from those requirements.2 04
Despite the strict registration requirements placed upon securities
under the Securities Act, sections 3 and 4 of the Act, as well as SEC rules,
provide several methods issuers may use to exempt securities from federal
registration requirements. Section 11-A-1 describes the exemptions provided
203 Howey, 328 U.S. at 297.
204id
2010 Shares of Thoroughbreds as Securities: Federal and 235
Kentucky Securities Laws Implications for Syndication in the
Breeding and Racing Contexts
for in the Securities Act, and Section nI-A-2 explains those exemptions that
have been created by the SEC in its rules.
1. The Securities Act of 1933
a. Section 3(a) (11)
Known as the Intrastate Offering exemption, section 3(a)(11) of the
Securities Act exempts from federal securities laws any security offered and
sold only to persons who reside within a single state or territory.205 However,
the issuer of the security must also be a person who resides and does business
within that state or territory.206 If the issuer is a corporation, that corporation
must be incorporated by and conducting business within that state or
territory.207
To aid issuers, the SEC has adopted Rule 147 to articulate its
interpretation of section 3(a)(1 1). The rule explains how residence is
determined for offerees and purchasers under the Intrastate Offering
exemption. A corporation, partnership, trust, or other business organization is
a resident if it has its principal place of business in the state or territory of the
issuance at the time of the offer and sale.208 However, if such organization is
established for the specific purpose of purchasing part of an issue offered
under Rule 147, that organization is not considered a resident unless all
beneficial owners of the organization are also residents of the state or territory
of the issuance.209 An individual is a resident if, at the time of offer and sale,
the individual has his principal residence in the state or territory of the
issuance.210
Though these clarifications may not be necessary to understand the
Intrastate Offering exemption, they are certainly helpful because the notion of
an intrastate offering rests on the common residency of the issuer and the
offerees or purchasers. Without that commonality, this exemption fails to be
useful for those hoping to issue securities in a single state or territory without
triggering federal securities oversight.
b. Section 3(b)
205 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(1 1) (2006).
206 id
207 id
208 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d)(1) (2007).
209 Id § 230.147(d)(3).2 1 1 Id. § 230.147(d)(2).
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This section of the Securities Act provides the SEC with the
discretion to use its rules and regulations to "add any class of securities to the
securities exempted" if enforcing the Securities Act with respect to the
securities at issue is not necessary considering public interest and the
protection of investors.21' However, the only instances where the SEC can
deem this to be true relate to securities issuances where a small amount of
money is involved or where the public offering is limited; otherwise, the SEC
212
may not use its discretion to exempt the securities. Regarding the term
"small amount," section 3(b) specifically requires that the security issuance be
of an aggregate amount less than or equal to $5,000,000 in order to satisfy its
exemption.2 13
c. Section 4(2)
This section, the Private Offering exemption, is deceptively simple in
its language. A security is exempt from the Securities Act registration
requirements under section 4(2) if it is issued in a transaction "not involving
any public offering."214 Logically then, a private offering is exempt. The
problem is that the Securities Act of 1933 leaves "public offering" undefined
so an investor or an issuer cannot know whether an issuance is a public
offering or a private offering just by reading the Securities Act.
However, the United States Supreme Court partially clarified section
4(2) by noting that its application turns on "whether the particular class of
persons affected needs the protection of the Act."215 Where the transaction
involves an offering made "to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves," it is not a public offering.2 16 Moreover the Court appeared to set
a standard for public offerings based on information availability: to apply the
Private Offering exemption, the offerees must have access to the kind of
information that would be disclosed in a securities registration statement.2 17
The SEC has also provided its interpretation of section 4(2). In a
statement that is of barely more help than reading section 4(2) itself, the SEC
stated that to determine whether a transaction is a public offering, the
complete context must be considered, "including such factors as the
relationship between the offerees and the issuer, the nature, scope, size, type
and manner of the offering." 218
211 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b) (2006).
212 id
213 id
214 Id. § 4(2).
215 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
216 id
217 Id. at 125-26.218 Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1962 WL
69540, at *1 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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Despite the uncertain understanding of "public offering" provided by
the Supreme Court and the SEC with respect to section 4(2), the SEC's
adoption of Rule 506, discussed below, sheds more light on the interpretation
of public offerings. It is important to note, however, that the Private Offering
exemption of section 4(2) and the exemption under Rule 506 are considered to
be separate exemptions, despite their apparent overlap.219
d. Section 4(6)
The exemption provided for in this section, the Accredited Investor
exemption, exempts transactions involving offers or sales to one or more
accredited investors as long as three criteria are satisfied: (1) the aggregate
offering price of the issue of the securities cannot exceed the amount allowed
under section 3(b) 22 0; (2) neither the issuer nor anyone acting on the issuer's
behalf engages in advertising or public solicitation related to the transaction;
and (3) the issuer must file the type of notice required by the SEC at the time
of the issuance.221 In addition to the $5,000,000 cap on the aggregate amount
of the issuance and the prohibition against public solicitation, the most
important aspect of the exemption is that it must be offered only to accredited
investors, a term defined in section 2.222
2. Regulation D
Regulation D, an amalgam of rules adopted by the SEC to elucidate
its position on limited offerings, has three rules that are especially pertinent to
the discussion of exempting securities. Of those three, Rules 504 and 505 fall
under the auspices of section 3(b) of the Securities Act and Rule 506 is a rule
promulgated under section 4(2).223 Each rule will be discussed in turn.
a. Rule 504
Under Rule 504, offers and sales of securities are exempt if they meet
several qualifications. First, the aggregate price offering is limited to
$1,000,000, less the aggregate amount of any securities sold within the twelve
months of the start of and during any offer to sell securities under Rule 504 in
reliance on an exemption under section 3(b) of the Security Act.22 4 Second,
219 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 75.
220 See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b) (2006). The amount in question, as explained
previously, is five million dollars.
221 Securities Act § 4(6).
222 Id. See § 2(a)(1 5)(ii) for the definition of "accredited investor."
223 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 83.
224 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2).
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the rule places no limitation on the number of investors, nor is there any
qualification placed on the type of investors.225  As a default, general
solicitation of purchasers is not permitted because Rule 504's provisions
require that Rule 502(c)'s terms and conditions be followed.226 However, this
limitation is lifted if(1) the securities are registered under a state law requiring
public filing and a delivery of a disclosure document to investors before the
sale, and that disclosure document is actually delivered 2 27 ; or (2) the securities
are sold under state law exemptions allowing for solicitations, but only when
sold to accredited investors.228
Significantly, Regulation D shares the same definition of accredited
investor as the Securities Act,22 9 but it is defined in Rule 501 rather than Rule
215, where the original definition of an accredited investor is found. The SEC
considers an accredited investor to be, among other possibilities, (1) any
director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities or
any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of the
issuer23 o; (2) any natural person with an individual net worth or a joint net
worth with the individual's spouse that exceeds $1,000,000 at the time of the
security purchase23 1; (3) any natural person with an individual income that
exceeds $200,000 in each of the past two years or a joint income with the
individual's spouse that exceeds $300,000 over the same period, and who has
a reasonable expectation of obtaining that same income in the current tax
,U232;233yea 32, or (4) any entity in which only accredited investors own the equity.
The last important requirement in order to cover securities under a
Rule 504 exemption is the limitation on resale of the securities, as provided in
the rule's requirement that 502(d)'s provisions relating to resales be
followed.234 However, because language in Rule 504 provides exceptions to
the application of Rule 502's restrictions,235 resales of securities exempted
under Rule 504 often are not problematic. Here, it suffices to say that the
securities may only be resold in public sales after certain criteria are met,
236
particularly a one-year holding period requirement.
225 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
226 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1). See also id. § 230.502(c).227 Id. § 230.504(b)(1)(i)-(ii). See also SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16,
at 84-85. Soderquist and Gabaldon provide a very useful table on pp. 84-85 that
summarizes the requirements for exemptions under Rules 504, 505, and 506.
228 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(iii).
22 9 Id. § 230.501(a).23 0 Id. § 230.501(a)(4).
231 Id. § 230.501(a)(5).
2 32 Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
233 Id. § 230.501(a)(8).
234 Id. § 230.504(b)(1). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
235 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1).
236 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 85.
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b. Rule 505
Like Rule 504, Rule 505 is also covered under section 3(b) of the
237Security Act. Securities are exempt under Rule 505 if several requirements
are met. First, the aggregate price offering of securities under Rule 505 must
not exceed $5,000,000, less the aggregate amount of any securities sold within
the twelve months of the start of and during any offer to sell securities under
Rule 505 in reliance on an exemption under section 3(b) of the Security
Act.2 38 Rule 505 also requires that the terms of Rules 501 and 502 be
satisfied.23 9  The result is that no general solicitations of purchasers are
allowed under Rule 505.240 Moreover, the resale of the securities in public
sales is restricted.24 1 Unlike Rule 504, Rule 505 places a restriction on the
number of investors who can purchase securities in any offering, a number
that is capped at thirty-five non-accredited investors,242 plus an unlimited
number of accredited investors.243 These investors also need not meet any
particular qualifications under Rule 505 in order for the exemption to apply.244
c. Rule 506
The last of the pertinent Regulation D rules under the SEC
exemptions, Rule 506, is a rule relating to the Securities Act § 4(2).245 Like
Rule 505, Rule 506 requires that the terms and conditions of Rules 501 and
502 be satisfied.24 6 Also like Rule 505, Rule 506 caps the number of non-
accredited investors who purchase securities in any offering at thirty-five, 24 7
but allows for an unlimited number of accredited investors.248 Because of the
application of Rule 502, Rule 506 also prohibits the general solicitations of
purchasers by the issuer.249 Under the Rule 506 exemption, restrictions, too,
are placed on the resale of the securities because of Rule 502's application.250
237 Id. at 83.
238 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).2 1d. § 230.505(b)(1).
240 Id. § 230.502(c).
241 Id. § 230.502(d). See also Soderquist & Gabaldon, supra note 16, at 84.
242 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
243 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
244 id.
245 Id. at 83.
246 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1).
247 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
248 SODERQUIST & GABALDoN, supra note 16, at 84.
249 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1). See also id. § 230.502(c).
250 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). See also id § 230.502(d).
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There are two principal differences between Rules 505 and 506. Rule
506 places no limit on the aggregate amount of the offering price,25 unlike
Rule 505's $5,000,000 limit.2 5 2  Also, Rule 506 establishes certain
qualifications that investors must meet if they are not considered accredited
investors under Rule 501's definition of that term. Put simply, non-accredited
investors must at least be sophisticated investors. 253 Rule 506 explains that for
a security to be exempt under the rule, each non-accredited investor must have
"such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," or
the issuer must reasonably believe that each purchaser meets this requirement
at a time just before the sale.254
There is another important piece of legislation that involves Rule 506.
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA)
amended the Securities Act of 1933 to read that a security which was
considered a "covered security" as defined by that Act was automatically
exempt from state securities laws registration. 255 Among those securities that
are considered "covered" under NSMIA are securities issued in connection to
a transaction that is exempt from registration under the Securities Act pursuant
to rules promulgated by the SEC under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.256
By its own language, Rule 506 is an exemption for transactions pertaining to
securities offerings under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.257 Hence, under
NSMIA, those securities that are exempt pursuant to Rule 506 are
automatically exempt from registration under state securities laws.
B. Kentucky Exemptions from the Registration of Securities
The process for considering the Kentucky exemptions is identical to
that for considering the federal exemptions. Assuming that a share of a
syndicated Thoroughbred is found to be an investment contract security to
which the registration requirements would normally apply, section 292.340
expressly provides that those registration requirements need not apply if the
security can be issued under an exemption. 2 58 The purpose of this section will
be to review those exemptions in two parts. Section III-B-1 will provide the
251 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
252 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
253 id.
254 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
255 National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996 § 102(a);
Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(A) (2006). Any future references to NSMIA will
cite to the pertinent Securities Act sections rather than the NSMIA sections in order
to maintain consistency when discussing the Securities Act, since the NSMIA in
art, amended the Securities Act § 18.
Securities Act § 18(b)(4)(D).
257 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
258 Blue Sky Laws § 292.340 (West 2009).
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exemptions set forth by the Kentucky General Assembly in the Blue Sky
Laws, and Section E-B-2 will cover the exemptions provided for in the
regulations issued by the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions'
Division of Securities.
Before discussing the specific Kentucky exemptions, it is important to
stress again that NSMIA, passed by Congress in 2006, automatically exempts
from state registration those securities that are covered securities.259 Among
those covered securities are those exempted from registration under the
Securities Act pursuant to SEC rules promulgated under section 4(2) of the
Securities Act.2 60 Ths includes a Rule 506 exemption. 2 61 The result under
Kentucky securities registration requirements is that a security that satisfies
the Rule 506 exemption requirements is a covered security and is, therefore,
automatically exempt from registration pursuant to Kentucky securities
laws.262 This point is reaffirmed by Kentucky Blue Sky Laws § 292.340,
which states that covered securities are exempt from Kentucky registration
263
requirements.
1. The Kentucky Blue Sky Laws: Exemptions
a. Section 292.410
While this section provides exemptions for several types of securities,
only one general subsection, section 292.410(l)(i), is really applicable for the
purposes of syndicating Thoroughbreds. The section states that an offer or
sale of a security by the security's issuer is exempt if several conditions are
satisfied.26 4 For example, the issuer cannot use a general advertisement or
general solicitation to offer or sell the securities. 265 The issuer must also have
a reasonable belief that each purchaser is buying the securities for investment
and knows of the limitations placed on resale and transferability of the
securities. 266  Assuming the above two conditions are met, then the next
condition can, in essence, be viewed as providing for three separate
exemptions. First, there is an exemption if each purchaser can access all the
material facts regarding the securities because of the purchaser's or his family
member's active involvement in or management of the issuer.267 The second
259 Securities Act § 18(a)(1)(A).
260 Id. § 18(b)(4)(D).
261 See 17 C.F.R. 230.506(a).
2 See Securities Act § 18(a)(1)(A) & 18(b)(4)(D); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
263 Blue Sky Laws § 292.340.
264 Id. § 292.4 10(1)(i).
265 Id. § 292.410(1)(i)1.
266 Id. § 292.4 10(l)(i)2.
267 Id. § 292.410(1)(i)3a.
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exemption applies when there are no more than fifteen purchasers in Kentucky
described in subdivision a (the "insider" exemption) plus an unlimited number
of accredited investors as defined by Rule 501 of the Securities Act of 1933.268
Lastly, the third exemption is applicable if the total offering price of the
securities, including those sold outside Kentucky, is not more than
$1,000,000; there are no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors,
including those purchasers outside Kentucky; and each purchaser either
receives all material information with respect to the decision to invest or is an
accredited investor, or is a person described in subdivision a (an "insider"). 2 6 9
2. The Kentucky Securities Regulations
The two sections that follow contain exemptions promulgated by the
Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions and are codified within the
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
a. Section 10:21rf70
This section provides state exemptions to those securities that are
exempt from registration under the Securities Act pursuant to Federal
Regulation D; specifically, the exemption applies to those securities that are
offered or sold in compliance with Rules 504 and 505.271 This exemption
applies ?rovided that the requirements of two other subsections are
satisfied. 72 The issuer must not offer to sell or sell the security by means of a
general advertisement or general solicitation except as allowed under Rule
504.273 Moreover, the issuer must reasonably believe that each purchaser who
is purchasing the security within Kentucky is doing so for investment
purposeS274 and is aware of the limitations placed on resale and transferability
of such securities.275 The issuer must also file a notice on Form D, either
within fifteen days after the first sale of a security into or from Kentucky if
sold pursuant to Rule 505,276 or at least ten days before the first sale into or
268 Id. § 292.410(1)(i)3b. See supra notes 230-33 and corresponding note text for
the relevant definitions of "accredited investor."269 Id. § 292.410(1)(i)3c.
270 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:210 (2000).
271 Id. 11).
272 d
2 7 3 Id. § 1(3)(a).
274 The term "investment purposes" is defined in 808 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 10:160
§ 1(2)(a)-(b). To be for investment, the security must be held for a year, must not
have been purchased with view toward resale, and must not be disposed of if not
registered or exempt. Id. § 1(2)(a)1-3. The buyer must be willing to bear the
economic risk of the security for an indefinite period of time, and must not need the
1 uidity of the investment. Id. § 1(2)(b) 1-2.
808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:210 § 1(3)(b)1a-1b.
2 76 Id. § 1(3)(c)1a.
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from Kentucky if sold pursuant to Rule 504.77 The remainder of section
10:210 lays out the informational requirements that must be filed as well as
the situations in which this exemption might be deemed not available.278
Because those provisions cover mainly minor details, they are left out of the
discussion here.
b. Section 10:340179
This final state exemption applies to certain limited offerings that are
offered only to accredited investors. 2 80 The section begins by adopting the
definition of an accredited investor as the term is defined in Rule 501 of
Federal Regulation D.28 1 The offering or sale must be made exclusively to a
person who is an accredited investor.282 The issuer must also believe that each
purchaser is buying the security as an investment and not with a view toward
resale. 283 To qualify as a purchase for investment, the purchaser must hold the
security for at least one year.28 If the purchaser does not, it will be presumed
that the security was bought with a view to distribute.285 However, if the
security is sold within one year to another accredited investor or pursuant to
Kentucky registration requirements, the presumption of a purchase with view
to distribute is not established.8
Also, the issuer may make a general announcement of the proposed
offering provided that the issuer complies with certain restrictions on what
information can be included in the announcement.28 7  Among the most
important restrictions, the issuer must specifically state that the offering is
only available to accredited investors and that money or other consideration
may not be solicited or accepted.
Conspicuously absent from this exemption are two things. First, the
exemption does not place a limit on the aggregate price of the securities to be
offered or sold.289 Second, the exemption places no limit on the number of
27 71 d. § 1(3)(c)1b.
278 See id. § 1(3)-(4).
279 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:340 (2000).280 id
281 Id. § 1. See supra notes 230-33 and corresponding note text for the relevant
definitions of "accredited investor."
282 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:340 § 2(1).
283 Id. § 2(3).
2 M Id § 2(3)(a).
285 id
286
287 Id. § 2(5)(a).
288 Id § 2(5)(b)6a-b.
289 See 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:340.
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investors who may purchase the securities.290  All that is required, as
mentioned previously, is that each and every investor must be an accredited
investor.291
C. Applying the Exemptions to a Share of a Thoroughbred: Breeding
and Racing Contexts
After discussing the exemptions from registration supplied by federal
and Kentucky statutes and regulations, the second step of this paper's analysis
can be completed by discussing the likely application of those exemptions to
shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds in both breeding and racing contexts.
1. The Breeding Context
The finding of a security does not automatically trigger federal and
Kentucky registration requirements because there is a wide range of
exemptions available under which the issuers may avoid the federal and
Kentucky registration requirements. However, in the context of syndicating
Thoroughbreds for breeding, because no security has been found where the
criteria of the Gainesway No-Action Letter is followed,2 92 and because the
United States Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
Kentucky Federal District Courts have never found a share of a Thoroughbred
syndicated for breeding purposes to be a security, it is not necessary to
speculate at this point about the application of exemptions to shares of
Thoroughbred stallions where those securities have never been found in
Kentucky. Thus, it suffices simply to note that if a share of a Thoroughbred
stallion is ever found to be an investment contract under Howey, then those
sellers and buyers within Kentucky will need to consider the federal
exemptions discussed above in Section 11-A and the Kentucky exemptions
discussed above in Section rn-B as a means to avoid the securities registration
requirements.
2. The Racing Context
Unlike the breeding context, the scenario for racing is quite different.
Section II-C-2 above concluded that is it entirely possible that shares of a
Thoroughbred syndicated during the horse's racing career will be considered
securities under federal and Kentucky securities laws. Hence, they will be
290 id
291 Id. § 2(1).
292 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with James Philpott, supra note 85. Both men stated that securities laws are not
typically a concern within the breeding sector of the Thoroughbred industry so long
as the Gainesway No-Action Letter criteria are followed.
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subject to the registration requirements unless an exemption is applicable.
Within the racing context, there are many possible exemptions available.
However, most of those exemptions, whether provided under federal
or Kentucky law, suffer pitfalls that make them less than ideal in practice.
Starting with the federal exemptions, an intrastate offering pursuant to section
3(a)(l 1) of the Securities Act would unduly restrict the potential investor pool
to only those investors who share common state residence with the issuer, a9
burdensome outcome for a global sport. A section 4(2) private offering is
discriminated against because of its ambiguity; a Rule 506 exemption, which
is promulgated under section 4(2), is easier to understand and to satisfy.294
The main problem with the section 4(6) exemption is that it limits the offering
only to accredited investors and caps the aggregate amount at $5,000,000.295
This is fine for racing syndicates if they prefer, but the Rule 506 exemption
gives them more options by allowing them to include unaccredited investors
and to offer an uncapped aggregate amount of securities.296 Rules 504 and
505 are also both available, but their downfall is that they cap the total amount
of any securities available to be offered by the issuer under the 504 and 505
exemptions within the prior twelve months. 2 97 This places severe restrictions
on the total number of horses that can be syndicated by an issuer under Rules
504 and 505 within a twelve-month period.9
The Kentucky exemptions are equally inadequate for racing
syndicates because they would have to be used in conjunction with the federal
exemptions, none of which are likely to be used other than Rule 506-as will
be explained below. For example, Kentucky securities regulation section
10:210 is applicable only for securities offered under Rules 504 and 505.299
These have been shown already to be less than ideal exemptions on which
issuers can rely. Moreover, section 10:340 of the Kentucky securities
regulations is extremely similar to the federal section 4(6) exemption, and
suffers the same drawbacks. While it does have an uncapped offering amount,
section 10:340 is only available to accredited investors, which limits the
potential investor pool that racing syndicates can tap.300
The Kentucky statutory exemptions also provide little help. Section
292.410(l)(i)3c is largely similar to Rule 505 and 506, but it places a
293 Securities Act § 3(a)(1 1).
294 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
295 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6) (2006).
296 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
297 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) & (b)(2)(i).
298 Id. The limits are $1,000,000 under Rule 504 and $5,000,000 under Rule 505.
299 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:210.
300 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:340.
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$1,000,000 cap on the amount of offering allowed.30 ' The next statutory
exemption basically applies only to those purchasers who are actively
involved in managing the organization.302 This exemption unfortunately does
not work for the syndicates, whose business model logically requires outside
investors. Finally, the last relevant Kentucky statutory exemption includes no
more than fifteen insiders of the issuer who are located within Kentucky as
well as an unlimited number of accredited investors. 303 The benefit here is
that there is no cap placed on the total aggregate amount permitted to be
offered. But again, the restrictions on who may purchase under the
exemptions are stringent.
Despite the shortcomings of most of the exemptions, there still are
two very good options for addressing the securities law issues with respect to
syndicating a Thoroughbred in the racing context. The first option is through
the use of a member-managed LLC. Kentucky Securities Regulations provide
a safe harbor under which membership interests in member-managed LLCs
automatically do not classify as securities.304 The benefit of using this safe
harbor is that fulfilling the provisions of section 10:360 means that the
membership interests are essentially not securities under federal law, and so
there is no need for issuers to use an exemption from federal securities
registration requirements. 3 05 There are potential drawbacks to section 10:360,
however. The number of investors is capped at thirty-five,06 and the investor-
members must either actively participate in management3 0 7 or must be able to
remove the managing member by vote.308  Because the issuer-promoters
typically maintain full control over the management of the Thoroughbred's
racing career, the best way to fall under the section 10:360 safe harbor is by
allowing members to remove the managing member by vote.
The biggest point of controversy for section 10:360 stems from the
jurisdiction of incorporation. A member-managed LLC incorporated in
Kentucky has no problem availing itself of the section 10:360 safe harbor.
However, there is uncertainty surrounding its availability for member-
managed LLCs incorporated in jurisdictions other than Kentucky. For
example, where a member-managed LLC is incorporated in another
jurisdiction but all of its members are Kentucky residents, the section 10:360
301 Blue Sky Laws § 292.410(l)(i)3c (West 2009).
302 Id. § 292.410(l)(i)3a.
303 Id. § 292.4 10(1)(i)3b.
3 808 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 10:360.
305 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
3 808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:360 § 1.307 id. § 1(1).
30 8 Id. § 1(2).
3 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
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safe harbor is available.3 10 It is not certain, though, whether that safe harbor is
available to non-Kentucky resident members bringing suit in the jurisdiction
of incorporation where a member-managed LLC is incorporated in a non-
Kentucky jurisdiction and membership is split between Kentucky and non-
Kentucky residents.311
It is evident that if the issue of availability of section 10:360 in other
jurisdictions can be avoided, the safe harbor is a very effective option for
syndicating racehorses in Kentucky. So long as the members can either
actively participate in management or can remove the managing member, their
interests are automatically deemed not to be securities under the Kentucky
laws.312 In practice, satisfaction of the section 10:360 requirements also
implies that the membership interests will not be securities under federal laws
and so there is no need for issuers to rely on federal exemptions.1
Unfortunately, the uncertainty as to section 10:360's availability for
non-Kentucky residents when the LLC is incorporated outside Kentucky
creates a big potential problem considering the tendency for racing syndicates
to pull investors from multiple states. If there is the possibility that the 10:360
safe harbor cannot be used outside Kentucky with non-Kentucky residents,
then issuers who do not incorporate the member-managed LLCs in Kentucky
could be forced to find exemptions from the securities registration
requirements of each state where its investors are residents as well as an
exemption from federal securities registration requirements.
To circumvent the problem of having to find several different state
and federal exemptions, the securities or interests can simply be sold pursuant
to a Rule 506 exemption, which automatically exempts the securities from
both federal and state securities laws' registration requirements.314 Because of
this simple solution, the Rule 506 exemption, the second option referred to
above for syndicating a Thoroughbred for racing, seems to be the best option
for syndicates selling interests in Kentucky. Aside from Rule 506's biggest
benefit, its automatic exemption from both federal and Kentucky securities
registration requirements, 1 there is also no dollar amount restriction placed
310 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, Member, Stites & Harbison (Mar. 3,
2010).
311 id
312 808 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 10:360 §§ 1(1)-(2).
313 Telephone Interview with Robert Beck, supra note 79.
314 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(A) & 18(b)(4)(D) (2006); Blue Sky Laws
§ 292.340 (West 2009); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
315 See Securities Act § 18(a)(1)(A) &18(b)(4)(D); Blue Sky Laws § 292.340; 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
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on the aggregate amount of the securities offering, 1 which means that racing
syndicates are capable of selling shares of as many horses as they can without
regard for timing issues. The only major constraint is the syndicates' financial
ability to purchase up front the horses in which they later syndicate by selling
interests to investors.
One limitation of Rule 506 is that the syndicates cannot offer or sell
the securities by general solicitation or general advertisement. Another is
that the exemption restricts the selling of shares to no more than thirty-five
318investors plus an unlimited number of accredited investors. Where those
investors are not accredited, they must be sophisticated, however. This means
that they must have sufficient knowledge and experience of business and
financial matters to be able to evaluate the risks and benefits of the potential
investment.319
Some of the triggering mechanisms that defeat a Rule 506 exemption
can also be sidestepped relatively easily. For example, a general
advertisement or general solicitation can be avoided by, for example, placing
restrictions on the syndicate website that permit only those attesting to be
accredited investors to view the roster of horses that are available for
syndication and the details of the syndication procedure. 320 Additionally, the
typical percentage ownership standards of two-and-a-half percent, five
percent, or ten percent321 necessarily caps the maximum number of
shareowners for any given horse at forty. This is well within the reach of the
Rule 506 exemption, especially if the racing syndicate targets mainly
accredited investors, whose number can be unlimited under Rule 506.322
To summarize, the Rule 506 exemption as a whole appears to be
more beneficial than the other exemptions and safe harbors. The exemption
allows non-accredited purchasers to invest in syndicated shares of
Thoroughbred racehorses.323 It has no limit on the amount of securities
offered, and it ensures the syndicates that at the very least, all the investors
will be sophisticated, if not accredited. 324  Most importantly, a sale of
securities pursuant to Rule 506 automatically exempts the securities from the
federal and the Kentucky registration requirements. 3 25 Thus, assuming that
316 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. The title of the rule indicates that it applies to "Sales
Without Regard to Dollar Amount."
3 Id. § 230.502(c).
318 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
319 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
320 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84.
321 Id.
322 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84.
323 Id.
324 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
325 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(A) & 18(b)(4)(D) (2006); Blue Sky Laws
§ 292.340 (West 2009); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
2010 Shares of Thoroughbreds as Securities: Federal and 249
Kentucky Securities Laws Implications for Syndication in the
Breeding and Racing Contexts
shares of Thoroughbreds used for racing are found to be securities, the racing
syndicates can still avoid federal and Kentucky securities registration
requirements if they can offer or sell the securities pursuant to a Rule 506
exemption.
IV. CONCLUSION
The sport of kings has a very long and distinguished past. As the
Thoroughbred breed has developed with the sport of horseracing itself, two
segments of the industry have evolved-breeding and racing. The evolution
of those two segments has resulted in the concept of syndication, the selling of
fractional interests in the Thoroughbreds.326 A logical result of syndication,
then, is the analysis of whether those fractional interests constitute securities
that are subject to federal and state securities laws.
This note first examined the federal and Kentucky definitions of a
security, in particular their respective definitions of an investment contract. It
then superimposed those tests onto shares of syndicated Thoroughbreds in
both the breeding and racing contexts to determine whether those shares
would be considered securities. The note then discussed the federal and
Kentucky exemptions under which securities could avoid registration.
Finally, these exemptions were applied to syndicated Thoroughbred shares in
both the breeding and racing contexts.
On the breeding side, the syndication of stallions has been the direct
result of the efforts of breeding farms to reduce their exposure to risk and to
ensure a consistent book of mares to be bred to the stallions on the farms.327
For the investors of the shares of Thoroughbreds syndicated for breeding, the
right to breed a mare to that stallion has been the principal reason for the
investment. As a result, the SEC has set forth guidelines in its oft-cited
Gainesway No-Action Letter that describes what criteria must be met to avoid
having stallion shares be considered securities.32 8 Moreover, no Kentucky
federal or state court has ever found the share of a Thoroughbred stallion to be
a security.329 Thoroughbred industry participants have also stated that
compliance with the Gainesway No-Action Letter will keep investors and
syndicates from having their shares classified as securities.330
326 Sweeney, supra note 139, at 422.
327 Telephone Interview with Doug Cauthen, supra note 140.
328 Gainesway, supra note 153, at *3.
329 See, e.g., Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6, 8, 9 (E.D. Ky.
1985).330 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with James Philpott, supra note 85.
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The racing context is quite the opposite. Syndicates claim to sell the
shares purely for entertainment value and not for profit."' Investors, on the
other hand, likely have some hope or expectation of earning a positive
financial return on their investments. And while there is no case law on point
in Kentucky, an SEC no-action letter, the Star Recruit No-Action Letter,
strongly suggests that syndicating a Thoroughbred during his racing career
could result in a finding that the shares of that Thoroughbred are securities
under both federal and state securities laws.332 However, even if those shares
are found to be securities, syndicates can attempt to make use of the many
federal and state exemptions to avoid registering those securities. In the
opinion of the author (supported by at least one syndicate), the best exemption
is a Rule 506 exemption, which has the effect of exempting the securities from
both federal and state registration requirements.333 Moreover, Rule 506's non-
imposition of a limit on the amount of securities permitted to be offered and
its allowance for thirty-five non-accredited (but sophisticated) investors and an
unlimited number of accredited investor 33 4 has two effects: (1) it increases the
potential pool of investors a syndicate can interact with while ensuring that
none of the investors are in over their heads; and (2) it allows a syndicate to
sell shares of as many racehorses as it is financially able to do without regard
to constraints on timing or aggregate offering amounts.
Significantly, regardless of whether investors participate in
horseracing on the breeding side or the racing side, they must be aware of the
potential securities law implications to their purchases. While the sport is at
first glance full of glamour and excitement, it also plays host to some
incredibly complex laws that must not be left at the gate when the horses
break.
331 Telephone Interview with Joshua Cooper, supra note 84; Telephone Interview
with Barry Irwin, supra note 174.332 See Star Recruit, supra note 190.
3 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(A) and 18(b)(4)(D) (2006); Blue Sky
Laws § 292.340 (West 2009); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a).
3 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 16, at 84. See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
